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Background: Although an increasing number of studies are documenting uses of syndromic surveillance by
front line public health, few detail the value added from linking syndromic data to public health decision-making.
This study seeks to understand how syndromic data informed specific public health actions during the 2009
H1N1 pandemic.
Methods: Semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted with participants from Ontario’s public health
departments, the provincial ministry of health and federal public health agency to gather information about
syndromic surveillance systems used and the role of syndromic data in informing specific public health actions
taken during the pandemic. Responses were compared with how the same decisions were made by
non-syndromic surveillance users.
Results: Findings from 56 interviews (82% response) show that syndromic data were most used for monitoring
virus activity, measuring impact on the health care system and informing the opening of influenza assessment
centres in several jurisdictions, and supporting communications and messaging, rather than its intended purpose of
early outbreak detection. Syndromic data had limited impact on decisions that involved the operation of
immunization clinics, school closures, sending information letters home with school children or providing
recommendations to health care providers. Both syndromic surveillance users and non-users reported that
guidance from the provincial ministry of health, communications with stakeholders and vaccine availability were
driving factors in these public health decisions.
Conclusions: Syndromic surveillance had limited use in decision-making during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in
Ontario. This study provides insights into the reasons why this occurred. Despite this, syndromic data were valued
for providing situational awareness and confidence to support public communications and recommendations.
Developing an understanding of how syndromic data are utilized during public health events provides valuable
evidence to support future investments in public health surveillance.
Keywords: Decision making, Pandemic influenza, Public health, Surveillance, Syndromic surveillance* Correspondence: ian.johnson@oahpp.ca
1Public Health Ontario, Toronto, ON, Canada
2Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON,
Canada
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2012 Chu et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Chu et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:929 Page 2 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/929Background
Syndromic surveillance, which uses pre-diagnostic data
for public health surveillance purposes, was initially
incorporated into public health surveillance for the early
detection of infectious disease outbreaks to improve on
the inherent time lags with surveillance data that are
reliant upon clinical or laboratory confirmation. Accord-
ingly, evaluations of syndromic surveillance tend to focus
on measuring the sensitivity and specificity of systems
for outbreak detection [1-4].
In 2004, the United States (US) Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) published a framework
for evaluating public health surveillance systems for
early detection of outbreaks (Table 1) [5]. However, some
components have received less attention, particularly the
measurement of usefulness in public health decision-
making [6-8]. This may be due in part to difficulties in
measurement. The CDC recommends assessing useful-
ness by determining the impact or value added from
linking surveillance data to public health actions.
Although an increasing number of studies are docu-
menting uses of syndromic surveillance by front line
public health, few provide information on how syn-
dromic surveillance is linked with public health action
[9-13]. In US case studies of potentially significant public
health events, syndromic surveillance was reported to be
useful for monitoring health impact, but had limited im-
pact on public health responses [9]. Similarly, interviews
with US health departments showed that although syn-
dromic surveillance was initially implemented for early
outbreak detection, in practice, health departments used
syndromic data for situational awareness, to confirm or
rule out events of significance and to support traditional
public health investigations and surveillance [14]. Add-
itionally, health departments sought to verify fewer than
15% of alerts generated from the syndromic surveillance
system because the alert was obviously a false positive or
resource constraints limited the ability for follow-up
[14]. Lastly, a web-survey of Ontario’s 36 local public
health departments, the provincial ministry of health and
federal public health agency found that syndromic data
were considered less useful for informing public healthTable 1 US CDC framework for evaluating public health
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• Costdecisions than laboratory testing data during the 2009
influenza pandemic (A(H1N1)pdm09) [15]. Nonetheless,
70% of organizations with access to emergency depart-
ment (ED) screening data felt that these data were essen-
tial for informing public health decisions on how to
respond locally to A(H1N1)pdm09.
We conducted a qualitative follow-up to the afore-
mentioned Ontario survey to describe syndromic sur-
veillance system experiences for systems used in Ontario
during the 2009 influenza pandemic, including whether
and how syndromic data informed specific public health
actions. For comparison, we included a sample of public
health departments without access to local syndromic
data to describe what information informed their public
health actions.Methods
Setting
During the 2009 influenza pandemic in Ontario, influ-
enza surveillance was comprised primarily of traditional
laboratory based surveillance and case investigation,
weekly reporting of sentinel physician influenza-like ill-
ness (ILI) consultations, over-the-counter respiratory
drug sales and antiviral prescriptions, daily monitoring of
calls to Telehealth (Ontario’s free, confidential telephone
service that the public may call to get health advice from
registered nurses), and local syndromic surveillance.
The latter refers to locally developed and implemented
systems designed to collect, analyze and use local data
on school absenteeism, workplace absenteeism, sentinel
physician ILI consultations and/or ED visits.Participant selection
Following completion of the 2010 web-survey [15], we
emailed invitations to medical officers of health and epi-
demiologists from the 31/36 local public health depart-
ments who consented to being re-contacted, as well as
the provincial ministry of health (public health and
emergency management branches) and the federal public
health agency (respiratory division) to share summary
results and to request further participation in the evalu-
ation. The organizations contacted comprised all those
responsible for public health surveillance of A(H1N1)
pdm09 at the local, provincial and federal level in On-
tario. Their views, therefore, were felt to be representative
of experiences in Ontario with operationalizing and using
public health surveillance data (including syndromic
data). Organizations interested in continuing (33/38) were
asked to identify two participants involved in A(H1N1)
pdm09 surveillance for a 60-minute semi-structured
interview - one person who could answer questions on
the decision-making process during the pandemic for
their organization (e.g. medical officer of health or
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ation of surveillance systems used (e.g. epidemiologist).
Data collection
Two interview guides, one for syndromic surveillance
system users (SSU) and another for non-users (NSU),
informed in part by the CDC framework, guided the
semi-structured interviews [5]. SSUs were defined as
organizations that systematically collect syndromic data
in (near) real-time, perform rapid analysis on the data
as it is received and disseminate findings to support
response. Interview questions were reviewed by the
study’s Advisory Committee and pilot tested with four
participants from the field. Each guide was distributed to
participants in advance for review.
The interview guide consisted of three sections [see
Additional file 1]. In section 1, descriptive information
on the syndromic surveillance system(s) (e.g. purpose,
uses, data sources and syndromes, frequency of data
provision, attributes, etc.) was solicited. This section was
completed and returned in advance of the interview.
In section 2 of the semi-structured interview, informa-
tion was collected on the timeliness, validity (measured
by whether the system detected wave two of the pan-
demic) and operation of systems used most frequently
from the web-survey (sentinel physician consults for
influenza-like illness (ILI), school absenteeism, ED visits
and/or febrile respiratory illness (FRI) screening data
from ED’s, and telephone helplines such as Telehealth),
while the uses of these systems during the pandemic to
inform specific public health actions was explored in
section 3. The guide for NSU’s consisted of a modified
version of Section 3, asking questions about actions
taken during the pandemic and the role of surveillance
data in informing these decisions. Specific public health
decisions of interest concerned the operation of influ-
enza assessment centres and immunization clinics, clos-
ing schools, sending health information home from
schools, providing recommendations to health care pro-
viders, and providing information to the public about
recommendations and influenza activity levels.
Telephone interviews were conducted privately with
each participant in their workplace by two trained
research staff (AC and RS) between November 2010 and
January 2011, with the exception of two interviews
where the participants requested a joint interview with
a colleague(s). Prior to commencing the interview,
the research staff, who were epidemiologists involved
in pandemic surveillance and research, described the
study’s goals. Interviews were digitally recorded and
transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriptionist.
Accuracy of each transcribed interview was verified with
the digital recording by the researchers and revisions
made as necessary.Data management and analysis
Section 1 responses were copied to an Excel file for ana-
lysis, while transcripts from section 2 and 3 interviews
were uploaded into NVivo 8W to assist with data organ-
ization, coding and analysis.
A coding scheme was developed based on the CDC
framework [5] and the interview guide, and modified
based on specific study objectives, study team discus-
sions, feedback from the Advisory Committee and pilot
testing. A deductive approach was used to assign the
data to overarching themes or categories for analysis
that reflected this scheme. Each interview was coded by
one of the two researchers who also conducted the inter-
views. Consistency in coding between the two research
staff was tested with four non-pilot interviews prior to
independent coding, at which time discrepancies were
resolved to facilitate consistency. One interview was
coded by both researchers at coding completion to con-
firm coding consistency over time.
NVivoW was used to code data and construct queries.
Within the overarching themes defined by the coding
scheme, a combination of content and thematic analysis
was used to analyze the interviews. Thematic analysis
was performed to identify emerging themes or patterns
using an inductive approach within and across the
categories defined by the coding scheme. To aid in the
recognition of these patterns, the constant compar-
ison method was used to determine how different pieces
of data were similar or different [16]. Content anal-
ysis was then performed to quantify the frequency of
the emerging themes or sub-categories. The emerging
themes were discussed amongst the research team,
revised, and then presented to the study’s Advisory
Committee for review, who deemed the themes credible
based on their understanding of pandemic surveillance
in the field.Ethics approval
Ethics approval was obtained from University of Toronto’s
Office of Research Ethics. Interviews were conducted only
after informed, written consent was obtained from the
study participants.Results
A description of study participants and their syndromic
surveillance systems is first presented to provide con-
textual information on the views being represented
and the syndromic data participants refer to in their
interviews. Following this, three key themes describing
the value of syndromic data for decision making are
presented: beneficial impacts; areas of limited impact
and the role of other influences; and limitations of syn-
dromic data.
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Overall, 31/33 (94%) of invited organizations agreed to
participate for an overall response rate of 82% (31/38).
The seven organizations who declined participation
were local public health departments of smaller and
medium size (2/9 departments serving a population size
of <125,000 and 5/13 departments serving a population
size of 125,000-400,000 declined). According to the web-
survey, four of the non-responders were classified as
NSUs and three as SSUs (Figure 1). For the 31 partici-
pating organizations, 19 met the definition for SSUs
(Figure 1). Among the 56 interviews conducted (involv-
ing 58 individuals), 34 interviews were from SSUs and
22 from NSUs. In five organizations, only one interview
was completed; and in one organization, three interviews
were conducted to account for the distribution of
responsibilities across individuals during the pandemic.
In addition to epidemiologists and medical officers of
health, who comprised 39% and 29% of participants,
other participants included managers (19%), directors
(7%), and nurses (5%).
Syndromic surveillance system descriptions
In total, 31 syndromic surveillance systems were in oper-
ation at the time of interview among the 19 syndromic
surveillance users; 26 of which were in operation during
the pandemic (Table 2). In Ontario, school absenteeism
and ED data were the most frequently used data sources
for syndromic surveillance.
With the exception of two non-custom syndromic
surveillance systems, all systems were created independ-
ently by each local health department. As a result, there
was substantial variation between systems, including
syndrome definition, frequency and method of data
transfer, and methods for aberrant event detection. Des-
pite this, the process of investigating alerts was similar
across systems. Epidemiologists would notify an internal
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Figure 1 Flow chart of study participants.there was clustering in age/grade or geography, triangu-
late syndromic data with other surveillance data and if
warranted, call hospitals or schools to try to elucidate a
potential cause for the increase.
Role of syndromic data in informing public health actions
A summary of the role of syndromic data and other fac-
tors in supporting specific public health decisions and
actions during the pandemic is shown in Table 3.
Beneficial impacts
Related to beneficial impacts, participants in 16/29
(55%) of the SSU interviews reported that ED data were
useful for informing the need for opening influenza as-
sessment centres. Total daily ED visit counts or visits for
ILI symptoms were used as indicators of the burden on
the health care system and as signals for opening
centres. Decreased demands in the ED and at the cen-
tres were signals for their closure.
“We looked back at ___ hospitals and calculated a
rough baseline during a normal flu season for visit
volume and then we chose a threshold that if we went
over that, we would open the assessment centres. As
soon as this occurred, we opened the assessment
centres that same day because they were planned and
ready to go.” (Participant 23, epidemiologist)
In addition to ED data, several SSUs (8/29 or 28%)
reported relying on stakeholder consultation to inform
the need for and timing of influenza assessment centres,
particularly in the establishment of thresholds or triggers
for opening centres. Syndromic data were also used
by the majority of SSUs (23/27 or 85%) for notifying
the public and stakeholders about A(H1N1)pdm09 activ-
ity in the community and informing the timing and con-
tent of communications made through organizational
websites, surveillance bulletins or through the media.
This information was felt to add credibility and confi-
dence which supported and reinforced public health
messages. Data from syndromic surveillance were also
frequently summarized (25/30 or 83%) in surveillance
bulletins to update staff within the organization, external
stakeholders and the public on community A(H1N1)
pdm09 activity.
“It (syndromic surveillance data) would have informed
the information they put into that, those
communication press releases. So again, that’s about
the risk communication side of things. . . People and
the media want to know what the impact is on the
community and the syndromic surveillance stuff is
actually quite good for defining that.” (Participant 56,
associate medical officer of health)
Table 2 Characteristics of Ontario syndromic surveillance systems, overall (N = 26) and by data source
System characteristic EDa SAa Othera Overall
n % n % n % Total %
Operation Length
1 year or less 2 22 4 40 1 14 7 27
2-4 years 3 33 5 50 1 14 9 35
5 years or more 4 44 1 10 5 71 10 38
Syndrome Based 9 100 4 40 6 86 19 73
Frequency of Data Provision
Real-time 4 44 0 0 0 0 4 15
Daily 3 33 6 60 3 43 12 46
Weekly 2 22 4 40 4 57 10 38
Mechanism of Transferb
Automated 5 56 3 30 0 0 8 36
Manual 2 22 6 60 2 67 10 45
Both components 2 22 1 10 1 33 4 18
Frequency of Monitoringc
More than daily 2 25 0 0 0 0 2 9
Daily 4 50 6 60 2 50 12 55
Weekly 1 13 4 40 2 50 7 32
Other 1 13 0 0 0 0 1 5
Threshold or Algorithm Used in Analysis 6 67 9 90 2 29 17 65
Response Protocolc 2 25 5 50 1 25 8 36
aED, emergency department visits (n = 9); SA, school absenteeism (n = 10), and other includes daycare absenteeism (1), OTC pharmacy sales (1), sentinel ILI
consultations (3), Telehealth (1) and workplace absenteeism (1).
b4 missing responses for Other systems. c1 missing response for ED systems and 3 missing responses for Other systems.
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and communication to partners. . . It gave I think a
level of confidence to the media that we were on top
of it as well as we could be. . .That’s immensely helpful
to be able to project confidence.” (Participant 32,
medical officer of health)Areas of limited impact and the role of other influences
Where syndromic data had limited impact on decision-
making was in the operation of immunization clinics
(with the exception of timing their closure) (14/30 or
47%), school closures (3/28 or 11%), sending information
home with school children (although 16/26 or 62% indi-
cated syndromic data supported communications with
schools) and recommendations and messages made to
health care providers (6/29 or 21%). Respondents stated
that vaccine availability (17/30 or 57%) and central guid-
ance from Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care (MOHTLC) (6/30 or 20%) were driving factors in
immunization clinic operations. Central recommenda-
tions were also influential in deciding not to close
schools (8/28 or 29%) and in messages to health care
providers, particularly with respect to infection controlpractices (14/29 or 48%). In some cases, no action was
taken despite higher levels of activity.
“We opened them (immunization clinics) as soon as
we had the supplies. . . the data that was coming
out of our system wasn’t used to dictate where they
were placed. They were opened in spots that we
normally would have our flu clinics and then the
extra ones were put in more remote jurisdictions
to decrease travel time for those residents who
were more geographically isolated.” (Participant 23,
epidemiologist)
“Well it (closing schools) wasn’t recommended right,
so they were just following the guidelines. I mean they
had lots of absenteeism. Schools were quite hard hit.
But there was no point in closing them. . .”
(Participant 54, associate medical officer of health)
Like SSUs, public health decisions by NSU’s regarding
the operation of immunization clinics were primarily
informed by vaccine availability (12/20 or 60%), while
MOHTLC guidance informed school closures (9/20 or
45%) and recommendations and messages made to
health care providers (14/21 or 67%). Stakeholder
Table 3 Role of syndromic surveillance and other factors in supporting public health decisionsa








ED data particularly used to
support opening and in some
instances, the location
Consultations with health care
providers about pressure on
the health care system
Consultations with health care
providers about pressure on
the health care system




Overall, provided picture of
virus activity in the community
and burden on the health care
system to inform the timing
and content of communications
Inclusion of standard infection
prevention and control
recommendations




regularly was made part of
regular practice
Guidance from the MOHLTC
and provincial teleconferences
Overall, provided credibility in
knowing the situation to help
support and reinforce messages
To be proactive Significant event, e.g. the first
lab confirmed case or death
Laboratory data were used
to provide updates about
community activity levels
Releasing communications
regularly was made part of
regular and collaborative
practice with media
Response to media requests
Use of surveillance bulletins Overall, used to communicate
and provide updates on virus
activity levels in the community
internally and externally
Providing/updating bulletins
was made part of regular
practice.
Providing/updating bulletins
was made part of regular
practice.





As a reflection of community
activity, all data generally
reinforced urgency of clinics and
supported timing of closures
Vaccine supply Vaccine supply
Demand for vaccine MOHLTC guidance




of space to accommodate




of space to accommodate
equipment, car parking and
line-ups
Closing schools Overall, data showed community-
wide spread and thus, would
not be helpful at preventing
transmission
Understanding of the potential
usefulness based on the
research literature and societal
impact if closed.
Understanding of the potential
usefulness based on the
research literature and societal
impact if closed.
For some local health departments,
school absenteeism data did not
suggest need to close.
MOHLTC guidance MOHLTC guidance
Sending information letters
home with school children
School absenteeism data identified
schools for targeted communication
about infection prevention and
control measures
First lab confirmed case or
death of a child
Vaccine availability for school-
aged children
Start of the school year First lab confirmed case or
death of a child




Requests by schools or school
boards
Recommendations/
messages to health care
providers
Overall, data was used to update
stakeholders regularly about H1N1
activity in the community and
support communications with
health care partners
Guidance from the MOHLTC
and provincial teleconferences





aMOHLTC, Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care.
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about pressures on the health care system and the need
to open influenza assessment centres (10/20 or 50%),
and as a means to maintain regular communications
with partners (8/21 or 38%).
“We communicated with our community partners
in health care and in school and education. This
information was updated and relayed to us at these
teleconferences, how they felt they were managing,
whether they felt they were getting overwhelmed
and that kind of thing. So it was basically directly
from them telling us how they were managing.”
(Participant 37, senior public health nurse)
Traditional surveillance from laboratory data were
used to monitor and provide updates on community
A(H1N1)pdm09 activity (5/21 or 24%) while commu-
nications with the public, including the use of sur-
veillance bulletins were made part of routine public
health practice (8/21 or 38%).
Limitations of syndromic surveillance data
Some limitations of syndromic data identified by partici-
pants included its poor specificity or ability to determine
if alerts were due to true events/disease, timeliness (data
were not received early enough to inform decisions) and
reliability (data were not received consistently from data
providers or were incomplete), particularly of reporting
by sentinel community practitioners of ILI consultations.
With many systems relatively newly implemented, sev-
eral SSUs also expressed not having baseline information
or algorithms/response protocols for interpreting syn-
dromic data and deciding when to initiate a public
health response.
Discussion
This study contributes to a small but growing body of
literature aimed at documenting whether and how syn-
dromic data is linked with public health action, and add-
itionally describes capacities to use these data. In the
context of the recent pandemic in Ontario, this study
shows that data from syndromic surveillance systems
had limited application in decision-making regarding
selected public health actions. Many of these decisions
were instead driven by other logistical and contextual
factors (e.g. vaccine availability and MOHTLC recom-
mendations). Other influences on decision-making for
both SSUs and NSUs were traditional surveillance from
laboratory data and communications with stakeholders.
Syndromic surveillance data were most frequently
used for communications and messaging, both internally
within an organization and externally with stakeholders,
partners and the media. Specifically, syndromic datawere used in surveillance bulletins to communicate
A(H1N1)pdm09 activity, improve risk communica-
tion and support recommendations, and in the operation
(e.g. opening, closing and placement) of influenza assess-
ment centres. Additionally, syndromic data were valued
for monitoring virus activity in the community and pro-
viding credibility and confidence to support decisions and
recommendations. These uses reflect a reactive approach
to the impact of A(H1N1)pdm09 activity on the health
care system, rather than a proactive approach to early
identification and action (e.g. advanced set up of control
systems such as assessment centres before health care
systems were pressured).
Few studies have examined the public health actions
taken in response to syndromic data. In the US, case
studies have found that even when received in a timely
manner, syndromic surveillance did not have an influ-
ence on public health actions for seasonal influenza [9].
In contrast, data from England and Wales’ national tele-
phone health advice helpline, NHS Direct, have been
used to track seasonal influenza and to communicate
risk of adverse events and provide reassurance to the
public following a fuel explosion [17,18].
US studies have also reported the use of syndromic
data for monitoring of disease activity and communicat-
ing surveillance findings to stakeholders and the commu-
nity [9,14,19]. Uncertainty about the ability of syndromic
surveillance to detect outbreaks has led to its greater
utility for situational awareness regardless of the method
of detection, particularly for monitoring influenza activity
and its public health impact [19]. The value of syndromic
surveillance for monitoring disease activity in the US is
reflected by the finding that 98% (40/41) of respondents
(from state, territorial and large, local jurisdictions) indi-
cated that they planned to use syndromic surveillance to
monitor the impact of pandemic influenza [19].
In this study population, syndromic surveillance was
most used for monitoring A(H1N1)pdm09 activity and
its impact on the health care system, as well as support-
ing communications and messaging, rather than use for
its intended purpose of early outbreak detection. SSUs
valued the information about community disease activity
that syndromic data provided and the reassurance and
confidence it provided to decision-makers. However, if
not linked to action or contributing to the prevention
and control of adverse health related events, the utility
and benefits of syndromic surveillance are unclear [5].
Given the use of syndromic surveillance to support and
reinforce public health messages, this study raises ques-
tions about the value of syndromic surveillance as an
adjunct to traditional influenza surveillance systems. It is
unclear how many surveillance systems are needed if these
systems are most beneficial for situational awareness and
providing supportive evidence to increase credibility and
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ity with syndromic surveillance systems and development
of algorithms for generating and responding to alerts may
improve its utility for decision-making. Even with such
enhancements, the utility of syndromic surveillance data
may continue to be constrained if other systemic barriers
are not addressed. Determining how and under which
conditions the utility of syndromic surveillance can be
maximized requires further study.
The strengths of this study include good representa-
tion (82%) from decision-makers and data users across
Ontario’s public health departments. The use of semi-
structured interviews gave participants flexibility in their
responses and allowed us to obtain a richer understand-
ing of system experiences. Having decision end points
and outcomes provided objectivity to evaluating the use-
fulness of syndromic data in supporting public health
actions during the pandemic.
One important limitation of this study’s findings is the
high level of variation we noted in the operation of syn-
dromic surveillance systems. With 27% of systems in
operation for less than two years, many users indicated a
lack of experience or ability to use historical trends to
define triggers for action, which likely contributed to
its limited use for decision-making. These findings are
similar to a study of eight US states where only 48% of
SSUs had written response protocols, and where the lack
of a systematic process for designing protocols and few
available information resources for response were identi-
fied [14]. For systems in place for longer than two
years, however, the reasons for not having triggers are
unknown. Additionally, as this study asked about use
of syndromic data for specific decision end points, whe-
ther syndromic surveillance had any additional indirect
impacts on decision-making more generally (beyond pro-
viding reassurance and confidence) remains unanswered.
As respondents were limited to those from local, pro-
vincial and federal public health agencies, we also have
not captured how syndromic data were used by data
providers (e.g. hospitals, schools). Another study limita-
tion includes the potential for recall bias as interviews
were conducted almost a year after the pandemic peak.
Although participants were assured of confidentiality,
other possible biases include providing responses that
are likely to be viewed more favourably, attract further
funding, or as socially desirable, especially when much
time and effort was invested in collecting and analyzing
syndromic data.
Conclusions
Syndromic surveillance systems had limited application
in decision-making for many of the public health actions
evaluated in this study. Despite this, syndromic data
were valued for monitoring local virus activity whichprovided credibility and confidence to support public
communications and recommendations. Developing an
understanding of how syndromic data is utilized during
public health events provides valuable evidence to sup-
port future investments in public health surveillance,
especially when resources are limited and choices need
to be made of where to invest. Further study is required
to determine whether improvements to systems, such
as automating and improving the frequency of data
provision or developing and applying algorithms to gen-
erate and respond to alerts, can improve the utility of
syndromic data for decision-making.
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